Abstract. We consider the problem of scheduling jobs on related machines owned by selfish agents. We provide a 5-approximation deterministic truthful mechanism, the first deterministic truthful result for the problem. Previously, Archer and Tardos showed a 2-approximation randomized mechanism which is truthful in expectation only (a weaker notion of truthfulness).
Introduction
The emergence of the Internet as the platform for distributed computation changed the point of view of the algorithm designer [16] , [17] . The old implicit assumption that the participating machines (agents) act as instructed can no longer be taken for granted. As the machines over the Internet are controlled by different users, they are likely to do what is most beneficial to their owners, manipulate the system and lie when it is possible to maximize their own profit. Where optimization problems are concerned, results can be severe and unexpected when false information is introduced to the classic optimization algorithms, due to the selfish behavior of the agents. * A preliminary version of this paper appears in the Proceedings of the 22nd International Symposium on Theoretical Aspects of Computer Science (STACS), 2005, pp. 69-82. Nir Andelman's research was supported in part by the Israel Science Foundation. Yossi Azar's research was supported in part by the German Israeli Foundation.
In this paper we deal with the minimum makespan problem for scheduling jobs on related machines (also known as Q C max ). The system allocates jobs with arbitrary sizes to the machines, where each machine is owned by an agent. The machines have different speeds, known only to their owner. In the first phase the agents declare their speeds, then given these bids the system allocates the jobs to the machines. The objective of the system is to minimize the makespan (namely, the maximum completion time over all machines). The classic scheduling problem (when information is complete and accurate) is known to be NP-Complete. Hence research has focused on obtaining a polynomialtime approximation algorithm for this problem.
The field of mechanism design provides a scheme to overcome the selfishness of the agents, mainly by paying the agents in order to force them to declare their true properties, thus helping the system to solve the optimization problem correctly. The most famous result in this area is the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism [7] , [10] , [18] , which applies to utilitarian objective only (the sum of the agent's valuations). The minimum makespan problem is not utilitarian as we are seeking to minimize the maximum load, not the sum of the loads. Applying the utilitarian solution to the problem would pile all jobs on the fastest machine, which could be as bad as a factor of m from the optimum.
Archer and Tardos introduced a framework for designing a truthful mechanism for problems in which each agent keeps in secret exactly one of the problem's parameters [5] . In particular, they considered the fundamental problem of scheduling on related machines, and they showed a randomized 3-approximation truthful mechanism, later improved to a 2-approximation [3] . Their mechanism utilizes a weaker notion of truthfulness, as it is truthful in expectation only.
Results in This Paper
Our main results are the following:
• We show a deterministic 5-approximation truthful mechanism for scheduling jobs on an arbitrary number of related machines.
• We show a deterministic truthful FPTAS for scheduling jobs on a fixed number of machines.
All results follow the framework of Archer and Tardos, introducing monotone algorithms together with a payments scheme computable in polynomial time.
Our truthful mechanisms are deterministic. Hence truth-telling is a dominant strategy over all possible strategies of an agent. In case of randomized mechanisms, where the mechanism is allowed to use random coin flips, different notions of truthfulness were considered [4] . A random mechanism can be viewed as a random selection from a collection of deterministic mechanisms. A random mechanism is universally truthful if all the deterministic mechanisms in the collection are truthful. A mechanism is truthful in expectation if bidding truthfully maximizes the agent's expected profit, but it may have some non-truthful deterministic mechanisms in its support. Clearly, truthfulness for deterministic mechanisms (which is analogous to universal truthfulness) is a stronger notion than truthfulness in expectation. Our mechanism is deterministic, in contrast to the 2-approximation randomized mechanism in [3] and [5] , which is truthful in expec-tation only. Following our paper Kovacs [13] gave an improved deterministic truthful mechanism which provides 3-approximation to the problem.
We also show the existence of truthful deterministic PTAS and FPTAS mechanisms for any fixed number of related machines. Our mechanisms improve the result of the (4+ε)-approximation truthful mechanism for a constant number of machines introduced in [6] and [2] . We present both mechanisms since our PTAS is fairly simple to implement and may be more efficient than the FPTAS if the required approximation ratio 1 + ε is moderate.
Previous Work
The classic problem of scheduling jobs on parallel related machines was dealt with by several approximation approaches. The known basic result of an LPT algorithm, which sorts the jobs in non-increasing order of job size then allocates a job to the machine that will be least busy afterward is a 2-approximation [9] . An FPTAS was first introduced by Horowitz and Sahni for the case where the number of machines is constant. Their approach was based on rounding an exact solution by dynamic programming [12] . Finally, in the late '80s Hochbaum and Shmoys introduced a PTAS for the general case of an arbitrary number of machines [11] , [8] . Since the problem is strongly NP-Complete, no FPTAS is possible for the general case, and their result remains the best possible, unless P = NP.
Scheduling with selfish agents was first analyzed by Ronen and Nisan. Their results mainly concern scheduling on unrelated machines, known also as R C max . Our problem was first tackled by Archer and Tardos [5] , who showed that the former known approximation algorithms for the problem are not truthful. They introduced a truthful randomized mechanism which achieves a 3-approximation to the problem. This approach achieves truthfulness with respect to the expected profit only. Thus it is possible that even though the expected profit is maximized when telling the truth, there might exist a better (untruthful) strategy given a particular outcome of the mechanism's coin flips.
The first deterministic result is due to Auletta et al. [6] . They show a deterministic truthful mechanism that is a (4 + ε)-approximation for any fixed number of machines. The case of an arbitrary number of machines remained open previous to our paper.
A different approach by Nisan and Ronen introduces another model in which the mechanism is allowed to observe the machines process their jobs and compute the payments afterward. Using these mechanisms with verification [14] allows application of penalty on lying agents and was shown to cope well with the existing known approximation algorithms.
Preliminaries
We consider the problem of scheduling jobs on related machines. We are given a number of machines, m, and a job sequence with sizes σ = ( p 1 , p 2 , . . . , p n ). We assume that the job sequence is sorted such that p 1 ≥ p 2 ≥ · · · ≥ p n ≥ 0. Each machine, owned by an agent, has a speed s i known only to its agent. Alternatively, the secret (sometimes called type) of each agent is t i = 1/s i which is the number of time units required to process one unit of work (or the cost per unit of work). Thus the processing time of job p j on machine i is p j t i . The work of machine i, denoted by w i , is given by the sum of the processing time of jobs assigned to it (the total work assigned to it). We assume a machine incurs a cost proportional to the total processing time spent. An output for the problem is an assignment of jobs to machines. The algorithm's goal is to minimize the maximum completion time over all machines.
A mechanism for this problem is a pair M = (A, P), where A is an algorithm to allocate jobs to the machines (agents) and P is a payment scheme. The mechanism asks each agent to report its bid (their cost per unit of work). Based on these reports, the mechanism uses A to construct an allocation, and it pays according to P.
A strategy for agent i is to declare a value b i as its cost per unit of work (which in principle can be larger or smaller than t i ). The output of the algorithm o(b) is an allocation of the jobs to the agents, and the profit of agent i is defined as
mechanism is truthful if truth-telling is a dominant strategy for each agent (i.e., t i is a dominant strategy for all i).
An algorithm A is a c-approximation algorithm if for every instance (σ, t), cost(A, σ, t) ≤ c · opt (σ, t). For our problem the cost is the maximum completion time. A c-approximation mechanism is one whose output algorithm is a c-approximation. A PTAS (Polynomial-Time Approximation Scheme) is a family of algorithms such that for every ε > 0 it contains a (1 + ε)-approximation algorithm. If the running time is also polynomial in 1/ε, the family of algorithms is an FPTAS.
A
Monotone Algorithms
Archer and Tardos showed necessary and sufficient conditions to obtain a truthful mechanism [5] . 
A decreasing work-curve means that when an agent bids lower (saying he is faster) more or equal amount of work should be allocated to his machine, given that the other agents' bids are fixed. A monotone algorithm is an algorithm that produces an assignment that preserves the decreasing work-curve property for all agents. Several classic approximation algorithms fail to keep this monotonicity, among them the LPT algorithm and the classic PTAS of Horowitz and Sahni [5] , [6] .
Definition 2.2.
A mechanism satisfies the voluntary participation condition if agents who bid truthfully never incur a net loss, i.e., profit i (t i , (b −i , t i )) ≥ 0 for all agents i, true values t i and other agents' bids b −i .
Theorem 2.1 [5]. A mechanism is truthful and admits a voluntary participation if and only if the work-curve of each agent is decreasing,
and the payments are as in (1):
Therefore in order to achieve a truthful mechanism we need to design a monotone algorithm and use the payment scheme as in (1) . Since truthfulness is reduced to designing a monotone algorithm, we may assume, for the sake of the monotonicity proof, that the bids are equal to the real speeds.
Truthful Approximation for an Arbitrary Number of Machines
A classic approximation algorithm for the problem forms a "valid" fractional allocation of the jobs to the machines and then uses a simple rounding to get a 2-approximation for the problem. In [5] it has been shown that this simple algorithm is not monotone, thus it is not truthful.
The main result of this section is a deterministic monotone algorithm based on the fractional assignment. Algorithm Monotone-RF (Monotone Rounded Fractional), shown in Figure 1 , is shown to be a 5-approximation algorithm.
Input: a job sequence σ , and a non-decreasing sorted bids vector
Output: an allocation of jobs to the m machines. Given a threshold T , we can treat the machines as bins of size T /b i . A fractional assignment of the jobs to the machines is a partition of each job j into pieces whose sizes sum to p j and an assignment of these pieces to the machines (bins). A fractional assignment is valid if each bin is large enough to contain the sum of all the pieces assigned to it, and for every piece assigned to it, it is capable of containing the entire job to which the piece belongs. The smallest threshold for which there exists a valid fractional assignment, T f is a lower bound to the optimal solution and can be calculated exactly in the following manner (see [5] ):
This valid fractional assignment with respect to this threshold is obtained by sorting the jobs in non-increasing order and allocating them to the machines (ordered in nonincreasing order of their speeds). Some jobs are sliced between two machines when the threshold is exceeded in the middle of a job.
An important property of the valid fractional assignment is the monotonicity of T f : as we increase the speed of a machine, T f is not increased. Let T f (b −i , b i ) be the the smallest threshold for which there exists a valid fractional assignment, given the bids
Note that an index of a machine in vector d can be different from the one in vector b due to the method of breaking ties in step 2 of the algorithm. From now on we refer to indices of the machines in vector d only.
Lemma 3.1. For any machine i that is not the fastest (i > 1), and for any rounded bids vector d,
Proof. The first inequality is straightforward as the allocation for
, given any fixed threshold T . As for the second inequality, we generate a valid fractional assignment that allocates zero work to machine i. This allocation would use a threshold of at most
Since this allocation is a valid fractional assignment for (d −i , β), the minimal threshold for (d −i , β) might only be smaller than the generated one.
To form an allocation that does not use machine i, for every 2 ≤ j ≤ i take all the pieces previously assigned to machine j and assign them to machine ( j − 1). The first machine is now allocated the pieces originally assigned to the second machine, along with its original assignment. Since the algorithm assures that 4d 1 ≤ d 2 , the assignment is clearly valid, with a threshold of at most
We note that Lemma 3.1 holds for rounded bid vectors created by algorithm Monotone-RF, but does not hold in general. The following lemmata consider several scenarios in which machine i increases its bid (slows down). We denote by 
Proof. If the rounded bid of machine i is the same as before the bid-increase, the assignment is not changed. Thus we consider the case where the new rounded bid is different from the one before the bid-increase. Let β be the rounded bid of machine i where β > d i . Let i be the new index of the bid-increasing machine in d . Clearly
e., the new threshold used by algorithm Monotone-RF can only increase due to the bid-increase. By induction the index of the last job assigned to each of the first i − 1 machines can be equal or higher after the bid-increase. Thus the total amount of work assigned to the first i − 1 machines is the same or higher, and the amount of work assigned to the first i − 1 machines can only be higher than that. Proof. We observe how the bin size of the first machine changes as its bid increases gradually. As long as for all j ≥ 2 the value of log 2.5 (b j /b 1 ) does not change, all rounded speeds change proportionally, i.e., there is some constant c > 1 such that d = c · d. Therefore, the same fractional assignment is calculated (with a new threshold of cT
with the same sizes for bins. In case log 2.5 (b j /b 1 ) changes for some j, i.e., the rounded bid of at least one machine is cut down by 2.5, by Observation 3.1 the threshold cannot increase, and therefore the bin size of the first machine can only decrease.
Since the fastest machine is always assigned the first jobs, a decrease in its bin size can only decrease the number of jobs assigned to it, and therefore the amount of work assigned to it in the integral assignment also decreases. Definition 3.1. Given an assignment of jobs by algorithm Monotone-RF, we classify the machines in the following way:
• Full machine-a machine (bin) assigned with jobs whose total processing time is at least the machine's threshold.
• Empty machine-a machine with no jobs allocated to it.
• Partially full machine-a non-empty machine (bin) that is not full. (There is at most one partially full machine).
Lemma 3.4. When machine i decreases its speed (increases its bid) the total work allocated to it by algorithm Monotone-RF cannot increase.
Proof. Lemma 3.3 proves the claim when machine i is the fastest machine and remains the fastest. If machine i is not the fastest machine but its rounded bid d i does not change, then the bid-increase has no effect since the same assignment is generated. It remains to prove the claim for the breakpoints: when the bid value of the fastest machine becomes larger than b 2 and when the rounded bid is multiplied by 2.5. We prove the claim for each step, thus the claim holds for the entire bid-increase. Consider the following cases for the class of machine i before the bid-increase:
1. Machine i is the fastest machine (i = 1), but after the bid-increase another machine j becomes the fastest. We observe the breakpoint where both machines have the same bid and add an artificial stage to the bid-increase where the title of the fastest machine passes from i to j (without having the bids change). The same threshold is calculated in both cases; only the order of the machines changes. The amount of work allocated to machine i when it is considered the fastest is at least 8 5 · v 1 · T f (d), while after machine j becomes the fastest it is at most
and therefore decreases.
Machine i is a full machine that is not the fastest. The threshold used for assigning jobs to the machine is T f (d). Due to Lemma
, where d is the rounded bids vector and d is the rounded vector after the bidincrease. Before the bid-increase the amount of work allocated to it was at least T f (d) · v i , whereas after increasing the bid it can become at most 2 · (
If the machine became partially full or empty after increasing its bid, the amount of work allocated to it can only be smaller. 3. Machine i is partially full. If it becomes empty then the claim is trivial, otherwise some jobs are allocated to machine i. Let i ≥ i be the new index of the machine in the sorted order. Due to Lemma 3.2 the amount of work allocated to machines with a lower index than i can be no less than the amount before the bid-increase (i.e., We now analyze the approximation provided by algorithm Monotone-RF.
Denote by k f (i) the index of the last job (or a fraction of a job) assigned to machine i in the fractional assignment. Respectively let k(i) be the index of the last job assigned to machine i by algorithm Monotone-RF.
Proof. By induction. The claim clearly holds for i = 1 since due to step 5, the total processing time of jobs assigned to this machine is at least T f (d) . Assume the argument is true for machine i. By induction hypothesis, k
Since allocation is done in non-increasing order of job size, the first job to be allocated to i + 1 by our algorithm might be only smaller than the one allocated by the fractional assignment. Moreover, since the allocation exceeds the fractional threshold, at least the same number of jobs will be assigned to machine i.
Theorem 3.7. Algorithm Monotone-RF computes a 5-approximation.
Proof. Lemma 3.6 assures that at the end of the run of algorithm Monotone-RF all jobs are allocated. Since the speeds were decreased by at most a factor of 2.5, the threshold T f (d) may be at most 2.5 times the value of the optimal allocation using the unrounded speeds. Since the speed of the fastest machine is increased by a factor of 1.6, the amount of work assigned to the fastest machine in the fractional solution may be at most 1.6 · 2.5 = 4 times the value of the optimal allocation.
In the integral solution, since the amount of work assigned to the first machine can exceed the bin's size by at most the size of the second bin, and since the first bin is at least four times larger than the second bin, the load on the fastest machine can be at most 1.25 · T f (d), and therefore the load on this machine is at most 1.25 · 4 = 5 times the optimal. For any other machine, the last job can exceed the threshold by at most T f (d), and therefore the load on any other machine is at most 2 · T f (d), which is at most 2 · 2.5 = 5 times the optimal. Therefore, a 5-approximation is achieved.
To conclude, we need to show that calculating the payments given by (1) can be done in polynomial time. We analyze the number of points (breakpoints) where the value of the work curve changes in that expression. According to Lemma 3.6, the work curve for machine i becomes zero furthermost when the valid fractional assignment does not use machine i. There is no use in assigning jobs to a machine when its bid β is too high even for the smallest job, i.e., βp
The only exception is when the integral is calculated for the fastest machine, where we get a higher bound of β ≥ n( p 1 / p n )b 2 . While β ≤ b 2 , there is a breakpoint whenever b j = 2.5 i β, for some i and for any machine j > 1. Therefore, for each factor of 2.5, there are at most m − 1 breakpoints (one for each of the other machines), while for β > b 2 , there is one breakpoint for each step.
Thus the number of iterations is O(log 2.5 (n( p 1 / p n )) + m log 2.5 (b 2 /b 1 )) for the fastest machine and O(m log 2. 5 (n( p 1 / p n )(b 2 /b 1 )) ) for the rest of the machines all together. Hence the computation is polynomial in the input size.
Input: a job sequence σ , a bid vector b = (b 1 , b 2 , . . . , b m ) and parameter ε.
Output: an allocation of jobs to the m machines that achieves a (1 + 3ε)-approximation.
1. Construct a new instance σ , based on the original job instance, as follows:
Merge the rest of the jobs in a greedy manner to chunks of size in the range [
leaving potentially at most one chunk smaller than 1 2 · ε 2 /m 2 , and add all chunks to σ . 2. Solve minimum makespan exactly with the instance (σ , b) to obtain the optimal solution. If several optimal allocations exist, choose the one with the lexicographically minimum schedule (where the machines are ordered according to some external machine-id). 3. Return the same allocation achieved on σ . A small job is allocated to the same machine where his chunk has been allocated. 
A Truthful PTAS Mechanism for Any Fixed Number of Machines
We now show a truthful mechanism for any fixed number of machines. Due to simplicity of presentation, we normalize the sizes of the jobs such that the total size of all jobs is one, n j=1 p j = 1 (as they are known to the mechanism). Based on the payment scheme in (1), it is enough to show a monotone PTAS algorithm. The algorithm, Monotone-PTAS, is shown in Figure 2 . This algorithm shares ideas similar to the PTAS variant of Alon et al. [1] .
Theorem 4.1. A mechanism design based on algorithm Monotone-PTAS and the payment scheme in (1) is truthful.
Proof. It is sufficient to show that algorithm Monotone-PTAS is monotone. Notice that the job sizes in the instance σ were generated independently of the bids of the agents. It was shown in [5] that the optimal minimum-lexicographic solution is monotone.
Theorem 4.2. The algorithm Monotone-PTAS achieves a Polynomial-Time Approximation Scheme (PTAS)
Proof. We first show that the algorithm is polynomial. The construction of σ takes linear time. As for the rest, the construction of σ ensures that the minimal job size is 1 2 · ε 2 /m 2 , except perhaps one job. Thus the total number of jobs is no more than 2m 2 /ε 2 , a constant. Solving σ exactly on m machines while enumerating all the possible allocations takes constant time.
We now analyze the quality of the approximation. First assume, for the purpose of the analysis, that both OPT and our algorithm are not using "slow" machines, i.e., machines whose speed is less than s max · ε/m, where s max is the maximum speed. Let T opt be the value of the optimal solution for this instance, and let T be our solution. Since we solve for chunks whose size is no more than ε 2 /m 2 , unlike OPT who solves for the original sizes, we can suffer an addition in processing time of maximum (ε 2 /m 2 )/(s max · ε/m) = ε/(m · s max ) (i.e., an additional chunk on the slowest machine used). A lower bound on the optimal solution is T opt ≥ 1/(m · s max ), thus T ≤ (1 + ε)T opt .
We now compare T opt to the performance of OPT when the "slow" machines restriction is removed, namely T opt . The total work done by the "slow" machines in OPT is bounded above by s max · εT opt . If we move this amount of work to the fastest machine we pay maximum extra processing time of εT opt , thus T opt ≤ (1 + ε)T opt . Combining these two lower bounds we get that
, a PTAS.
To conclude, we need to show that calculating the payments given by (1) can be done in polynomial time. Notice that the integral in this expression has a constant number of points (breakpoints) in which the value of the work curve changes. Hence calculating the payments can be done in constant time.
A Truthful FPTAS Mechanism for Any Fixed Number of Machines
We now show another truthful mechanism for any fixed number of machines. The mechanism uses a c-approximation algorithm as a black box to generate a c(1 + ε)-approximation monotone algorithm. Using an FPTAS as the black box (for example, the FPTAS of Horowitz and Sahni [12] ) outputs a monotone FPTAS. Adding a payment scheme as in (1) ensures truthful mechanism. The algorithm, Monotone Black Box, is shown in Figure 3 . Output: an allocation of jobs to the m machines that achieves a c(1 + ε)-approximation. In case of a tie, choose the assignment with the lexicographically maximum schedule (i.e., allocating more to the faster machines). Proof. The output assignment is a c-approximation for the vector d, since d is tested in the enumeration and since sorting the assignment can only improve the makespan. As for the original bid vector b, rounding the bids adds a multiplicative factor of 1 + ε to the approximation ratio. Normalizing the vector has no effect, nor trimming the largest bids, since any non-zero assignment to a machine with a bid of at least (1 + ε) l cannot be a c-approximation, since the load on that machine will be more than c times the load of assigning all the jobs to the fastest machine.
Construct a new bid vector
d = (d 1 , d 2 , . . . , d m ), in the following way: (a) For j = 1 · · · m, let d j = (1 + ε) log 1+ε b j . (b) Normalize vector d such that min j d j = 1. (c) For each bid, if d j ≥ (1 + ε) l+1 where l = log 1+ε (cn · max i p i / min i p i ) then set d j = (1 + ε) l+1 . 2. Enumerate over all possible vectors d = ((1 + ε) i 1 , (1 + ε) i 2 , . . . , (1 + ε) im ),
Theorem 5.2. If the black box in algorithm Monotone Black Box is an FPTAS, then the algorithm itself is also an FPTAS.
Proof. By Theorem 5.1, if the black box in algorithm Monotone Black Box is an FPTAS, i.e., c = 1 + ε, then the algorithm is a (1 + ε) 2 -approximation. It remains to prove that the running time is polynomial in the input, including 1/ε. In each iteration of the enumeration, applying the black box, sorting the output assignment and testing it on the vector d can be completed in polynomial time, by the assumption that the black box is an FPTAS. The size of the enumeration is O(l m ), where m is a constant and l is polynomial in the input.
Theorem 5.3. Algorithm Monotone Black Box is monotone.
Proof. We prove that if a machine j raises its bid (lowers its speed) then the amount of work assigned to it cannot increase. We increment the bid in steps, such that in each step the power of 1 + ε that equals the rounded bid rises by one. We prove the claim for a single step, and therefore, the claim also holds for the entire increment.
We first assume that d j is not the unique fastest machine (i.e., there is a machine k = j
l then by the proof of Theorem 5.1, the assignment to machine j must be null, otherwise the approximation ratio is not achieved. Clearly, by raising the bid the assignment will remain null, and the claim holds. Therefore, we assume that the normalized rounded bid rises from d j to d j (1 + ε), the assignment changes from W to W , and the amount of work allocated to machine j changes from w j to w j > w j .
We 
T (W, d ) = T (W , d
). Therefore, we have a tie between W and W for both d and d . Since in each case the tie is broken differently, it must be that W = W . Since the assignment is sorted (the faster machine is assigned more work), if a machine decreases its speed then the amount of work assigned to it (by the same assignment) cannot increase, which is a contradiction to w j > w j .
If machine j is the unique fastest, then due to the normalization of the rounded bids and trimming of high bids, after it raises its bid by one step the new bid vector d will be as follows: d j remains 1, bids between 1 + ε and (1 + ε) l decrease by one step, and bids equal to (1 + ε) l+1 can either decrease to (1 + ε) l or remain (1 + ε) l+1 . Letd be the same bid vector as d , with all the bids of (1 + ε) l+1 replaced with (1 + ε) l . Since machines that bid (1 + ε) l or more must get a null assignment, then the optimal assignment (among all assignments that are considered by the algorithm) ford is the same as d . The same assignment remains the optimum for vectord (1 + ε) , where all bids are incremented by one step. The bid vectord(1 + ε) is exactly the bid vector d, with d j replaced with 1 + ε (instead of 1). By the same argument from the case where machine j is not the unique fastest, the work assigned to machine j ind(1 + ε) is at most the same as the work assigned in d, and therefore the algorithm is monotone for the unique fastest machine as well.
To conclude, we claim that the payments for each agent can be calculated in polynomial time. Consider the work-curve inside the integral expression in (1) . The number of points (breakpoints) where the work-curve changes is bounded by the number of possible allocations considered by the algorithm, which is polynomial in the input size (including 1/ε).
Conclusions and Open Problems
We have shown a deterministic constant-approximation truthful mechanism for assigning jobs on uniformly related machines, and an FPTAS truthful mechanism for the special case where the number of machines is fixed. The main open question left is whether a truthful PTAS mechanism exists in the case of an arbitrary number of machines.
